University of Chicago Law School

Chicago Unbound
Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics
Economics
2004

Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Environment
Cass R. Sunstein
CassR.Sunstein@chicagounbound.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/law_and_economics
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Cass R. Sunstein, "Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Environment" (John M. Olin Program in Law and
Economics Working Paper No. 227, 2004).

This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and
Economics at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law
and Economics by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact
unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

CHICAGO
JOHN M. OLIN LAW & ECONOMICS WORKING PAPER NO. 227
(2D SERIES)

Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Environment
Cass R. Sunstein

THE LAW SCHOOL
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
October 2004
This paper can be downloaded without charge at:
The Chicago Working Paper Series Index: http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html
and at the Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection:
http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=604581

draft 9/27/04
All rights reserved

Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Environment
Cass R. Sunstein*
Abstract
This review-essay explores the uses and limits of cost-benefit analysis in the
context of environmental protection, focusing on three recent books: Priceless, by Frank
Ackerman and Lisa Heinzerling; Cellular Phones, Public Fears, and A Culture of
Precaution, by Adam Burgess; and Catastrophe: Risk and Response, by Richard A.
Posner. The review-essay emphasizes three principal limitations on the use of costbenefit analysis. First, it is important to distinguish between the easy cases for costbenefit analysis, in which the beneficiaries of regulation pay all or almost all of its cost,
from the harder cases, in which the beneficiaries pay little for the environmental
protection that they receive. In the harder cases, net welfare gains and distributional
advantages are possible even if environmental regulation fails cost-benefit analysis.
Second, there are possible uses, in the environmental context, of maximin rather than
cost-benefit analysis, especially when regulators are attempting to control catastrophic
risks where probabilities cannot be assigned. An Anti-Catastrophe Principle makes sense
for such situations. Third, human beings are citizens, not merely consumers, and this
point requires abandonment of the willingness to pay criterion in some contexts.
In the United States, cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is in the ascendancy. For over
twenty years, American presidents have required agencies to perform CBA for major
regulations; indeed, they have told agencies to regulate only if the benefits of regulation
justify its costs.1 Congress has also shown considerable interest in CBA, most
prominently in the Safe Drinking Water Act, which asks agencies to produce quantitative
assessments of both costs and benefits. For their part, federal courts have adopted a series
of principles that promote CBA, saying that if Congress has not been clear, agencies may
consider costs, take account of the substitute risks introduced by regulation, and exempt
trivial risks from governmental control.

*

I am grateful to Elizabeth Emens, Charles Larmore, Martha Nussbaum, and Richard Posner for extremely
valuable comments on an earlier draft of this review.
1
The developments discussed in this paragraph are traced in Cass R. Sunstein, Risk and Reason
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

In its enthusiasm for cost-benefit analysis, the United States provides a sharp
contrast to Europe, which has shown intense interest in a quite different organizing
principle for environmental protection: the Precautionary Principle.2 According to the
Precautionary Principle, regulation is required even in the face of scientific uncertainty—
even if it is not yet clear that environmental risks are serious. A central point of the
Precautionary Principle is to recognize the limitations of existing knowledge and to
protect against harm that cannot yet be established as such.
CBA and the Precautionary Principle can lead in radically different directions. For
example, many Europeans argue that the consequences of genetic modification are
uncertain, that real harm is possible, and hence that stringent regulation is readily
justified. By contrast, many Americans respond that the likely benefits of genetic
modification are far greater than the likely harms and that stringent regulation is therefore
unsupportable. Or consider global warming. Many European leaders have argued in favor
of precautions, even extremely expensive ones, simply to reduce the risk of catastrophe.
But under President George W. Bush, American officials have called for continuing
research on the costs and benefits of controlling greenhouse gas emissions.
The tension between CBA and the Precautionary Principle raises serious
questions about the theory and practice of environmental protection. To engage in costbenefit analysis, regulators must make difficult and often speculative judgments about the
likely effects of alternative regulatory strategies.3 The easiest task is often the
identification of costs, but even here there are formidable empirical problems. It is
difficult to project the expense of regulations of different levels of stringency, especially
because environmental protection often spurs technological innovation, greatly reducing
the cost of pollution reduction. The identification of benefits presents even harder
empirical problems -- and knotty normative and conceptual ones as well. At a minimum,
agencies must estimate the savings that are likely to result from regulation, including
reductions in mortality and morbidity, along with improvements in terms of visibility,
2

See, e.g., Arie Trouwborst, Evolution and Status of the Precautionary Principle in International Law
(Kluwer Law International, 2002); The Precautionary Principle in the 20th Century: Late Lessons from
Early Warnings (Poul Harremoes et al. eds.) (London: Earthscan, 2002).
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The Office of Management and Budget has issued guidelines to govern and to standardize the use of costbenefit balancing. See Office of Management and Budget, Regulatory Analysis, Circular A-4 (September
17, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/regpol.html#rr
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recreation, aesthetics, animal welfare, property values, and more. When science leaves
room for doubt, as it often does, agencies typically specify a range of possibilities,
representing low-end estimates and high-end estimates in addition to the best “point”
estimate. Agencies might, for example, project that a certain regulation will save as many
as eighty lives each year and as few as zero, with a preferred estimate of twenty-five.4
These numbers inevitably involve a degree of guesswork.
After specifying the likely benefits, CBA requires agencies to engage in multiple
acts of conversion, assigning economic values to human lives, human morbidity, and a
range of harms to the environment. Typically American agencies assign monetary values
on the basis of private “willingness to pay” (WTP).5 For example, the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) values a human life at about $6.1 million, a figure that comes
from real-world markets.6 In the workplace and for consumer goods, additional safety has
a price; market evidence is investigated to identify that price. The $6.1 million figure,
known as the value of a statistical life (VSL), is a product of studies of actual workplace
risks, attempting to determine how much workers and others are paid to assume mortality
hazards. Suppose that people must be paid $600, on average, to eliminate risks of
1/10,000; suppose, for example, that workers who face risks of that magnitude generally
receive $600 in additional wages each year. If so, the VSL would be said to be $6
million. Where market evidence is unavailable, agencies often produce monetary
valuations on the basis of contingent valuation surveys, which ask people how much they
are willing to pay to save coral reefs or endangered species, to eliminate a risk of chronic
bronchitis or curable lung cancer, and much more. Drawing on market evidence and
contingent valuation studies, the EPA has recently valued a case of chronic bronchitis at
$260,000, an emergency hospital visit for asthma at $9,000, hospital admission for
pneumonia at $13,400, a lost work-day at $83, and a specified decrease in visibility at
$14.7

4

See Cass R. Sunstein, The Arithmetic of Arsenic, in Risk and Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2002).
5
See W. Kip Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).
6
See Frank Ackerman and Lisa Heinzerling, Priceless: On Knowing the Price of Everything and the Value
of Nothing (New York: The New Press, 2003).
7
See Cass R. Sunstein, The Cost-Benefit State 145 (American Bar Association: Washington, DC 2002).
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Once a CBA is produced, what should be done with it? The most ambitious
answer is that agencies should adopt regulations only when the likely benefits exceed the
likely costs—and that if several regulations meet this test, agencies should select the one
that “maximizes net benefits.” On this approach, CBA provides a clear rule of decision,
one by which regulators should be bound. A more cautious response would be that
agencies should generally require benefits to exceed costs, and also seek to maximize net
benefits, but that they need not do so; on this view, the outcome of the CBA provides a
presumption but no more. The presumption could be rebutted by showing that the
particular situation justifies a departure from the result indicated by CBA—as, plausibly,
in cases in which poor people would stand to gain a great deal. A still more cautious
approach would be that in deciding what to do, agencies should consider the outcome of
CBA alongside such other variables as they deed relevant. There are important
differences between those who would make CBA determinative and those who would
merely make it relevant. But even on the most cautious understandings of the role of
CBA, government’s choices would be significantly affected by the translation of
environment benefits into monetary equivalents.
To say the least, it is highly controversial to say that people’s protection against
environmental risks is properly measured by their WTP to avoid those risks. It is at least
equally controversial to use WTP as the basis for policies protecting endangered species,
nature, and wildlife. But the Precautionary Principle raises serious problems of its own.
How much precaution is the right level of precaution? Are costs relevant to the answer?
In any case human beings face a number of risks, not simply one, and any effort to reduce
one risk might well increase another risk. Is it possible, even in principle, to take
precautions against all risks, rather than a subset? If all risks cannot be reduced at once,
how should regulators set priorities?
In this essay, I approach these questions through a discussion of three illuminating
books that offer radically different approaches to environmental protection. Frank
Ackerman and Lisa Heinzerling believe that CBA is a hopelessly crude tool, one that
buries indefensible judgments of morality and politics.8 Drawing on the war on terrorism,
they argue for the Precautionary Principle instead. By contrast, Adam Burgess uses the
8
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controversy over cell phones to suggest that the Precautionary Principle capitulates to,
and even promotes, baseless public fears.9 Objecting to what he sees as excessive fear of
new technologies, Burgess argues for careful attention to scientific evidence and for
regulation only when the risk is real. Richard Posner argues for CBA and economic
analysis in a context in which it seems least promising: catastrophic risk.10 He contends
that global warming, and other potentially catastrophic problems, cannot sensibly be
approached without a disciplined effort to quantify and monetize both costs and benefits.
But where Ackerman and Heinzerling see CBA as an excuse for regulatory inaction,
Posner invokes CBA on behalf of aggressive controls on greenhouse gases and other
sources of potentially serious danger. Indeed his central goal is to draw private and public
attention to catastrophic risks that are exceedingly unlikely to come to fruition.
Building on the arguments made by Burgess and Posner, I shall mount a qualified
defense of CBA here. Without some sense of both costs and benefits—both nonmonized
and monetized—regulators will be making a stab in the dark. Human beings have a great
deal of difficulty in assessing risks, making them prone to both hysteria and neglect;
CBA does not supply definite answers, but it can help to establish which risks are serious
and which are not.11 By contrast, the Precautionary Principle approaches incoherence.
Because risks are on all sides of social situations, and because regulation itself increases
risks of various sorts, the principle condemns the very steps that it seems to require.
But building on the arguments made by Ackerman and Heinzerling, I shall
suggest that there are two serious problems with CBA. The first is that WTP is sometimes
an inappropriate basis for environmental policy. Human beings are citizens, not merely
consumers, and their consumption choices, as measured by WTP, might be trumped by
their reflective judgments as citizens. In any case, WTP is dependent on ability to pay;
when the poorest members of societies stand to gain from environmental protection, they
should be protected even if their poverty ensures that their WTP is low. The second
problem is that regulators cannot always assign probabilities to environmental outcomes.
9

See Adam Burgess, Cellular Phones, Public Fears, and a Culture of Precaution (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2004).
10
See Richard A. Posner, Catastrophe: Risk and Response (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).
11
See Allan Gibbard, Risk and Value, in Values At Risk 94 (Douglas MacLean ed.) (New Jersey: Rowman
and Allanheld, 1986), for an exploration of “a principal rationale for wanting something like risk-costbenefit analysis: for seeking a way to regiment our judgments about risk, and so to avoid the blatant
irrationalities of unaided common sense.”
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If probabilities cannot be assigned, regulators are unable to engage in CBA; they might
do well to follow the maximin principle, taking steps to avoid the worst-case scenario.
This point helps pave the way toward a narrower and more refined use of the
Precautionary Principle, one that has important real-world applications and that provides
a valuable complement to approaches based on CBA.
I. Monetization and Its Discontents
Ackerman and Heinzerling do not object to efforts to specify the range of
outcomes associated with alternative courses of action.12 Their principal objection is to
the WTP criterion. Insisting that human deaths are not mere “costs,” Ackerman and
Heinzerling contend that CBA is morally obtuse. They argue that a well-functioning
democracy should respect the informed judgments of citizens, rather than aggregating
private consumption choices. Ackerman and Heinzerling much prefer the Precautionary
Principle, which, in their view, is “a more holistic analysis ” that argues for regulation in
the face of scientific uncertainty and that is “committed to fairness within and beyond this
generation” (p. 234).
Ackerman and Heinzerling are aware that many people have turned to CBA
because of widely publicized studies that purport to show a high level of arbitrariness in
modern regulation.13 According to such studies, regulations in the United States are
wildly inconsistent. Sometimes the United States spends $100,000 (or less) to save a
human life. Sometimes it spends tens of millions. Cost-benefit supporters ask: Shouldn’t
nations be devoting their resources to serious health problems rather than trivial ones? If
a nation can spend ten million dollars to save one thousand lives, shouldn’t it do that,
rather than wasting the money on a similarly priced program that saves only one or two
people? In any case human beings make many errors in assessing risks, using heuristics
and demonstrating biases that make them exaggerate some dangers and underestimate

12

I discuss their book for a popular audience in Cass R. Sunstein, Your Money or Your Life, The New
Republic 27 (March 15, 2004); my treatment here borrows from that discussion.
13
The most well-known is John F. Morrall III, A Review of the Record, Regulation, November/Decmebr
1986, 25, 30, Table 4. For an updated treatment, see John F. Morrall III, Saving Lives: A Review of the
Record, 27 J. Risk and Uncertainty 221 (2003)
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others.14 These errors seem to be replicated in existing policies; CBA might be defended
as a promising corrective to blunders in citizens’ perception of risk. In these ways,
interest in CBA has been fueled less by contentious claims of value than by the pragmatic
suggestion that it can assist in more intelligent priority-setting.15
Ackerman and Heinzerling believe that the attack on the current system is based
on misleading studies, burying controversial and indeed implausible judgments of value.
True, some regulations do not prevent many deaths, but they do prevent serious
(nonfatal) harms to human health and also harms to ecosystems. The resulting benefits
should not be disparaged. More fundamentally, Ackerman and Heinzerling argue that the
key studies find low benefits partly because they greatly “discount” future gains to life
and health. Everyone agrees that a dollar today is worth more than a dollar in twenty
years; economists use a standard “discount rate” (often 7% annually) to convert future
dollars into current equivalents. In calculating the benefits of regulation, they use the
same discount rate for lives saved and illnesses averted. Ackerman and Heinzerling
contend that this approach wrongly shrinks the value of regulations that will save people
in the future. One of their central claims, then, is that the standard discount rate should
not be applied to future savings in terms of life and health.
Suppose that their arguments are right—that once economic values are properly
assigned to environmental gains, few existing regulations will be condemned as requiring
huge investments for trivial benefits. Regulators still might want to use cost-benefit
analysis to improve current decisions.16 Ackerman and Heinzerling complain that to do
this, they will have to produce a dollar value for a human life—and any such effort will
be arbitrary, offensive, or worse. They reject the view that WTP, based largely on
workplace studies, produces information that agencies should use. In their view, workers
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A good collection is Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment (Thomas Gilovich et
al. eds) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). For use of this idea in (qualified) defense of costbenefit analysis, see Gibbard, supra note.
15
David M. Driesen, The Economic Dynamics of Environmental Law (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003),
offers a powerful criticism of cost-benefit analysis insofar as it offers a static account of both costs and
benefits and fails to see that regulation and other forces often produce innovation, thus reducing the
expense of environmental protection. I believe that this argument is best taken as a reason for skepticism
about existing figures about likely costs, rather than as an attack on cost-benefit analysis as such. See
Matthew Adler, Cost-Benefit Analysis, Static Efficiency, and the Goals of Environmental Law, 31 B. C.
Environmental Affairs Law Review 591 (2004).
16
See W. Kip Viscusi, Rational Risk Regulation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
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often have little information about the risks that they face, and hence they cannot be
charged with consciously trading hazards against dollars. Even when workers are
informed, they may have few options and hence little choice. If they accept a job with
significant hazards for a low premium, it is not because they are genuinely free to choose.
Some anomalies in the empirical literature are highly relevant here. Nonunionized
workers have sometimes been found to receive little or nothing for the reduction of
statistical risks, and African-Americans have been found to receive much less than white
people do.17 Does it follow that regulators should treat the lives or nonunionized workers,
or African-Americans, as worth especially little? Ackerman and Heinzerling add that the
key studies ask only how much individuals care about risks to themselves. They ignore
the fact that many of us value the lives of others too. I might be willing to pay only $60 to
eliminate a 100,000 risk that I face, but I might be willing to pay much more than that to
eliminate that risk from my child’s life, and substantial amounts to help reduce the risks
of my friends. Altruism is ignored in the current calculations.
Ackerman and Heinzerling also contend that statistically equivalent risks should
not be treated the same, because people’s valuations of mortality risks depend not only on
the probability of harm but also on their nature and their context. About 3000 people died
from the terrorist attacks of 9/11—a much smaller number than die each year from
suicide (30,500), motor vehicle accidents (43,500), and emphysema (17,500). Ackerman
and Heinzerling approve of the fact that the reaction of the United States to the 9/11
attacks was not based on simple numerical comparisons. Drawing on work by
psychologist Paul Slovic,18 Ackerman and Heinzerling emphasize that the risk judgments
of ordinary people diverge from the risk judgments of experts—not because ordinary
people are stupid or confused, but because they have a different normative framework for
evaluating risks. While experts focus on the number of deaths at stake, most people are
especially averse to risks that are unfamiliar, uncontrollable, involuntary, irreversible,

17

John D. Leeth & John Ruser, Compensating Wage Differentials for Fatal and Nonfatal Injury Risk by
Gender and Race, 27 J. Risk & Uncertainty 257 (2003).
18
See Paul Slovic, The Perception of Risk (London: Earthscan, 2000).
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inequitably distributed, man-made, or catastrophic.19 Diverse valuations of diverse risks
should play a role in regulatory policy.
For example, most of us are not greatly troubled by the cancer risks associated
with x-rays, partly because they are voluntarily incurred. By contrast, the risks of
terrorism and even pesticides and air pollution are more alarming because individuals
cannot easily control them. And when a risk is faced by an identifiable community—as,
for example, when landfills with toxic chemicals are located in largely poor areas—the
public is especially likely to object to what it will perceive as unfairness.20 Ackerman and
Heinzeling thus complain that CBA disregards important qualitative differences among
quantitatively identical risks. It also tends to ignore, and often to reinforce, patterns of
social inequality, above all because it pays no attention to a key question, which is
distributional: Who receives the benefits and who incurs the costs? For both domestic and
international environmental issues, Ackerman and Heinzerling emphasize the importance
of fairness. If environmental threats mostly burden poor people, regulators should take
that point into account, whatever the cost-benefit ratio.
Ackerman and Heinzerling are also concerned about how cost-benefit analysts
value nature. How much will human beings pay to save an animal or a member of an
endangered species? Economists have tried to answer the question by actually asking
people. For example, one study find that the average American family is willing to pay
$70 to protect the spotted owl, $6 to protect the striped shriner (an endangered fish), and
as much as $115 per year to protect major parks against impairment of visibility from air
pollution. Ackerman and Heinzerling ridicule these numbers, complaining that any
precise monetary value fails to provide useful information. Bans on whaling, for
example, are rooted in a widely shared ethical judgment, not on cost-benefit analysis. A
democracy should base its decisions about the protection of nature on such ethical
judgments, rather than by aggregating people’s willingness to pay.

19

But see Howard Margolis, Dealing With Risk (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), for a
challenge to this account of the lay/expert division in risk perceptions.
20
Note, however, that the Not In My Backyard Syndrome – known in the trade as NIMBY – suggests that
many people will make self-serving judgments about the proper location of environmentally risky
activities. This point is related to the suggestion, developed below, that people tend to become intuitive
cost-benefit analysts when both the benefits and the costs of environmental regulation are on-screen.
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Ackerman and Heinzerling offer a final objection to cost-benefit analysis: the
rights of future generations. I have noted that economists generally apply a discount rate
to future gains and losses. With a 7 percent discount rate, $1000 in twenty years is worth
only $260 today. Cost-benefit analysts within the federal government have long applied
the usual discount rate for money (7 percent) to the benefits of safety and health
regulation, so that prevention of 1000 fatal cancers in 2025 is equivalent to the prevention
of 260 fatal cancers in 2005. Ackerman and Heinzerling respond that lives are not like
money; they cannot be placed in a bank for the accumulation of interest. A discount rate
of 7 percent radically shrinks the value of reductions in risk for those born, say, one
hundred years from now. But current generations owe obligations to the future and
should not discount measures that protect people not yet born.
Invoking the Precautionary Principle, Ackerman and Heinzerling argue that
nations are obliged to take action against serious threats even before there is a scientific
consensus. Above all, they want regulators to make regulatory decisions by attending to
the worst-case scenario. If the worst case is extremely bad, aggressive regulation is
desirable even if it might result in wasted money. When a nation spends too much on
regulatory protection, it loses limited resources, which admittedly is undesirable; but
waste is far better than catastrophe. Hence their “preference is to tilt toward
overinvestment in protecting ourselves and our descendents” (p. 227). Ackerman and
Heinzerling urge that this approach was taken in the context of the military spending of
the Cold War, arguing that the nation rightly prepared for the high-risk case. They see
protection against terrorism in similar terms. Ackerman and Heinzerling want to treat
health and environmental risks in the same way.
II. Pointless Precautions?
Ackerman and Heinzerling do not focus in detail on any particular regulatory
issue. By contrast, Burgess explores the idea of “precaution” with close reference to a
single controversy: the health risks associated with cellular phones. Burgess does not
explicitly discuss CBA, but he is highly skeptical of the Precautionary Principle, which,
in his view, leads regulators to capitulate to baseless public fear. One of Burgess’ central
claims is that public fears are often manufactured rather than found; for this reason,

10

Burgess describes himself as a “social constructivist” (p. 11). But with respect to risk,
Burgess is no constructivist at all. He believes that some risks are serious and that others
are not, and that science is the best way to tell the difference.
Burgess contends that notwithstanding countless efforts, no reputable study has
demonstrated significant health risks as a result of emissions from cell phones and cell
phone towers.21 To date, much of the so-called evidence comes from anecdotes of the sort
provided by anti-cell phone activist Debbie Collins, who contended that her daughter’s
health had significantly improved after she was removed from a school near a cell phone
tower. Rejecting expert opinion, Collins stated: “She’s a different child now—it’s all the
proof I need to convince me there is a link between those wretched masts and the health
of children” (p. 1). Another mother said, “I needed no more proof than that. This term he
started at a new school and I can already see the change in him. His memory has
improved and his headaches have gone” (p. 2). Burgess is concerned that a precautionary
approach, founded on statements of this kind, will both aggravate fear and impose costs
for no good reason.
Burgess’ tale begins with a media campaign. In the early1990s, a number of
newspaper stories in the United Kingdom contended, on the basis of little evidence, that
mobile phones and base stations were producing harmful health effects. Apparently
influenced by these stories, the European Commission in Brussels began an official
inquiry in 1995, ultimately funding future research and concluding that adverse effects
could not be ruled out. Public fears intensified in 1996 after the issue received attention in
a consumer health program on the BBC and a widely read news story in the Sunday
Times featuring the headline, “Mobile phones cook your brain.” In 1997, alarmist reports
grew in the media, suggesting that cell phones could produce illness and premature
mortality (and also reduce sex drives). These reports helped to spur citizen action. By
1999, local political campaigns against cell phone towers became prominent, and they
received favorable coverage in local and regional newspapers, which further energized
public concern.
21

A different set of issues is raised by the risks associated with use of cell phones while driving. Here there
is much stronger evidence of serious hazards. For an overview, see Robert Hahn and James Prieger, The
Impact of Driver Cell Phone Use on Accidents (July 2004), available at http://www.aeibrookings.org/publications/abstract.php?pid=806
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These campaigns significantly affected both private and public institutions. The
London Metropolitan police service told its officers to limit cell phones as a “purely
precautionary measure” (p. 87). Harrods banned cell phones from its premises. Speaking
in explicitly precautionary terms, entrepreneur Richard Branson recommended the use of
safety devices for his employees. Local governing councils across the United Kingdom
attempted to ban or restrict mobile towers, particularly those near schools. At the national
level, the Minister for Public Health legitimated public fears, insisting that in such a
context, “it is very important that” officials “work very hard to keep ahead of public
anxiety” (pp. 88-89). In Burgess’ account, precautionary responses by official institutions
helped to fuel that very anxiety. Thus it “is only through being taken seriously by state
bodies that the allegations about hypothetical risks have been able to command authority
and acquire momentum beyond the immediate reactions of some individuals” (p. 222).
Burgess also makes some interesting and somewhat puzzling remarks about crosscultural comparisons. In the United Kingdom, there was intense public focus on cell
phone risks; similar concerns have been found in Australia, Italy, and South Africa. In
Italy, the Environment Minister established a “green hotline” asking people to state their
complaints about “abusive” siting of cell phone towers. The Australian government
funded a large-scale research project on potential adverse health effects. But in the United
States, the brief burst of concern in the early 1990s rapidly dissipated, to the point where
it is hard to find any serious private or public concern about health risks. And in Finland,
no discernible public fear has arisen at all, even though Finland has the highest
percentage of cell phone users in the world. (The fact that Nokia is Finland’s biggest
company is highly relevant here—a point, bearing on both precautions and CBA, to
which I will return.)
Burgess thinks that the cell phone controversy is merely one example of the
misuse of precautionary thinking in domains in which scientific evidence fails to support
people’s fears. For example, he challenges European skepticism about genetically
modified food, describing it as “alarm” (p. 259); and he mounts a broader attack on what
he sees as the unhelpful belief that it is wrong to interfere with nature. He is therefore
troubled by a wide climate of sensitivity to small risks, especially those that are novel and
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associated with technological innovation. Precautionary thinking, he believes, helps to
create a culture of fear.
III. Catastrophe, Costs, and Benefits
Judge Richard Posner is one of the founders of the economic analysis of law, and
he should be expected to be enthusiastic about CBA. In Catastrophe: Risk and Response,
he does not disappoint that expectation. What makes the book noteworthy is its focus on
the application of CBA to truly catastrophic risks—those that might threaten the survival
of the human race. Posner covers an extraordinarily wide range of hazards, including
genetically modified crops, robotics, and nanotechnology, but he focuses in particular on
four: asteroid collisions, particle-accelerator disasters, global warming, and bioterrorism.
Posner believes that none of these risks can be dismissed, and he thinks that cost-benefit
analysis should be applied to each of them.
Consider, for example, the dangers associated with very powerful particle
accelerators. It is extremely unlikely, but not impossible, that such accelerators will
produce a highly compressed object called a “strangelet,” which has the ability to convert
whatever it encounters into a new form of matter. Posner quotes Sir Martin Rees,
professor of physics at the University of Cambridge, who writes, “A hypothetical
strangelet disaster could transform the entire plant Earth into an inert hyperdense sphere
about one hundred meters across.”22 Posner accepts the widely held view that a strangelet
disaster is exceedingly improbable, but he insists that it cannot be ruled out. As a result,
he thinks that nations should at least be willing to ask whether the benefits of very
powerful particle accelerators justify incurring the risk. On that question, he is quite
doubtful.
Posner’s discussion extends over a wide range. Because my topic is
environmental protection, I shall focus on his treatment of global warming.23 Posner
believes that the associated risks should be taken seriously, above all because of the
possibility of truly catastrophic harm. He acknowledges that the leading economic expert

22

See Martin Rees, Our Final Hour 120 (New York: Basic Books, 2003).
For a general discussion, see Stephen Gardiner, Ethics and Global Climate Change, 114 Ethics 555
(2004).
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on global warming, William Nordhaus, estimates its total cost at $4 trillion24—a high
figure, to be sure, but hardly astronomical, and one that allows cost-benefit analysis to get
off the ground. (The United States has an annual GDP of $10 trillion, and as Posner
points out, $4 trillion represents present value, which might be compared with the present
economic value of the United States, which is roughly $100 trillion.) Nordhaus produces
his $4 trillion figure essentially through the methods that Ackerman and Heinzerling
deplore—using WTP and discounting the future.
Posner is concerned not with the objections made by Ackerman and Heinzerling,
which he implicitly rejects, but with the possibility that Nordhaus’ estimate greatly
understates the problem, above all because of the dangers of abrupt warming, which
would be especially destructive. Thus Posner thinks that existing models do not rule out
the possibility of (for example) very rapid changes in both temperature and sea levels, the
evolution and migration of deadly pests, and even a runaway greenhouse effect, produced
by melting of tundras, thus releasing large quantities of additional greenhouse gases. One
worst-case scenario is “snowball earth,” covering the world with a layer of ice several
kilometers thick, a result of massive increases in cloud cover, preventing sunlight from
reaching the earth. Sounding very much like Ackerman and Heinzerling, Posner seeks to
draw attention to the worst that might happen.
Many scientists and economists, including Nordhaus, believe that global warming
is not likely to create catastrophic harm, and that the real costs, human and economic,
will be high but not intolerable. In their view, the worst-case scenarios can be responsibly
described as improbable.25 Posner disagrees. He believes that “no probabilities can be
attached to the catastrophic global-warming scenarios, and without an estimate of
probabilities an expected cost cannot be calculated.” In the terms of decision theory,
Posner contends that global warming presents a situation of uncertainty, where
probabilities cannot be assigned to outcomes, rather than risk, where such probabilities
can be assigned.26 In this way, global warming differs from other potentially catastrophic
24
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risks that Posner explores, such as the strangelet disaster, which everyone characterizes as
exceedingly unlikely.
In general, Posner does not claim that responses to catastrophic risks should be
chosen solely by reference to CBA. But he proposes that CBA “is an indispensable step
in rational decision making in this as in other areas of government regulation. Effective
responses to most catastrophic risks are likely to be extremely costly, and it would be
mad to adopt such responses without an effort to estimate the costs and benefits.” While
favoring CBA, Posner rejects the Precautionary Principle because of its “sponginess.” He
contends that once that principle becomes sensibly tempered, it turns into a form of CBA
with risk aversion—that is, a form of CBA that creates a margin of safety to protect
against those dangers that produce special concern. This understanding of the
Precautionary Principle, he believes, is perfectly reasonable, but it turns the principle into
a version of CBA, not a rival (as Ackerman and Heinzerling claim).
Posner emphasizes that any effort to apply CBA to catastrophic risks requires a
great deal of guesswork. Consider the proposal to build a new and very powerful particle
accelerator, Brookhaven’s Relativistic Heavy Ion Collider. Posner is concerned about the
remote possibility that the Brookhaven Collider will destroy the earth; he wants to
evaluate the proposal by reference to CBA. He notes that no effort has been made to
monetize its benefits, but he ventures a “wild guess” that they amount to $250 million per
year. (It is extremely hard to produce a figure, monetized or nonmonetized, to capture the
benefits of basic research; for this reason Posner’s guess is indeed wild.) With that
amount, the Collider would have a net present value of $400 million: $21.1 billion in
benefits, assuming a 3% discount rate, over a projected ten-year span, minus the
accelerator’s construction and operating costs, which are $1.1 billion. But what is the
monetized value of the extinction risk? To answer that question, Posner needs to estimate
both the probability of extinction and its monetized cost if it comes to fruition. For
probability, he ventures a figure of 1 in ten million—a figure that he also deems
“arbitrary,” though it is in line with several estimates by expert risk assessors. For
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monetized cost, based on WTP to reduce statistical risks27 and a 3% discount rate, he
values the loss of the human race at $600 trillion. Doing the arithmetic, Posner believes
that the net benefits of the Brookhaven Collider are negative: –$100 million. Thus he
concludes that the Collider should not be built.
Posner acknowledges that “global warming is the poster child for the limitations
of cost-benefit analysis” (p. 222). But even here, he thinks that it is possible to make
progress by attempting to be as quantitative as possible. Most economists, armed with
cost-benefit analysis, oppose the Kyoto Protocol, arguing that its monetized costs
probably would exceed its monetized benefits. Recall that the monetized costs of global
warming are estimated at around $4 trillion. For the world as a whole, the monetized
benefits of the Kyoto Protocol are estimated at far less than those costs: only $108
billion.28 The reason is that the protocol would do relatively little about the problem of
global warming. Greenhouse gases stay in the atmosphere for a long time, and the Kyoto
Protocol would not, of course, affect those emissions that have already occurred. In
addition, its provisions do not limit developing nations, primary sources of greenhouse
gases, at all (a primary complaint of the Bush Administration); and for the industrialized
world, it would merely stabilize emissions modestly below 1990 levels. Hence the
benefits of the Kyoto Protocol would be modest, consisting as they would of a mere
reduction in the increase of global warming emissions. At the same time, the Kyoto
Protocol would impose significant costs on those subject to it, producing a total global
cost ranging from $59 billion to $884 billion.29 The standard view is that the Kyoto
Protocol fails CBA, because it is likely, in its implementation, to inflict costs in excess of
the $108 billion gains.
Posner thinks this analysis is badly incomplete, because it ignores the possibility
that government regulation will force technological innovation, thus producing dramatic
decreases in greenhouse gas emissions; and dramatic decreases are necessary to reduce
the risk of catastrophe. Posner is particularly interested in the potentially desirable effects
27
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of significant taxes on carbon emissions. Such taxes would create economic incentives to
develop clean fuels and better methods of carbon sequestration. Posner acknowledges
that in view of existing uncertainty and the high costs of emissions controls, it is tempting
simply to wait for more scientific information (as the Bush Administration has argued).
One problem with this approach is that of irreversibility: Once greenhouse gases are in
the atmosphere, they stay there for a long time. In a key passage, he argues that making
“shallower cuts now can be thought of as purchasing an option to enable global warming
to be stopped or slowed at some future time at a lower cost.”
Posner does not offer a formal CBA for various approaches to the global warming
problem. The reason is that his fundamental concern is abrupt warming, to which he
believes that no probability can be assigned. In contrast to his quantitative analysis of
particle accelerators, his analysis of global warming does not offer many numbers.
Indeed, his own form of balancing does not have a transparent structure; his major
argument involves the option analysis just described, with the suggestion that current cuts
give us the flexibility to reduce warming in the future if that is what we choose to do. He
thus argues in favor of aggressive emissions taxes on greenhouse gases, above all to
reduce the possibility of catastrophic risk.
IV. Problems with Precautions
These three books cover three quite different issues: the idea of precaution; the
translation of environmental harms into monetary equivalents; and the appropriate
approach to environmental regulation in the face of scientific uncertainty. Let us explore
these issues in turn.
Ackerman and Heinzerling argue in favor of the Precautionary Principle. Burgess
rejects it as leading to nonsensical outcomes. Posner believes that it must be converted
into a form of CBA, one that embodies an aversion to those risks that deserve particular
concern. At first glance, it is tempting to say, with Burgess, that the idea of precaution
will lead to excessive controls on small or nonexistent risks. It is equally tempting to say,
with Posner, that the idea is simply too vague to provide guidance; how much precaution
is enough? But the most serious problem lies elsewhere. In many contexts, the
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Precautionary Principle is incoherent.30 Risks are often on all sides of social situation,
and risk reduction itself produce risks. Hence the Precautionary Principle, taken for all
that it is worth, forbids the very measures that it requires. Ackerman and Heinzerling
neglect the fact that regulation can create dangers of its own, in a way that suggests that
along some dimensions, many precautions are not precautionary at all. Advocates of
precaution often emphasize the costs associated with a product or process, without seeing
that it may have benefit as well; and sometimes those benefits involve the environment
itself. Why should regulators examine only one side of the ledger?
For example, regulation often gives rise to substitute risks, in the form of hazards
that materialize, or are increased, as a result of regulation. Consider the case of DDT,
often banned or regulated in the interest of reducing risks to birds and human beings.
From the standpoint of the Precautionary Principle, the problem with such bans is that in
poor nations, they eliminate what appears to be the most effective way of combating
malaria—and thus significantly undermine public health.31 Or consider the United States
Environmental Protection Agency’s effort to ban asbestos, a ban that, on health grounds,
might well seem justified or even compelled by the Precautionary Principle. The
difficulty, from the standpoint of that very principle, is that substitutes for asbestos also
carry risks. The problem is pervasive. The Precautionary Principle is often invoked as a
reason for banning genetic modification of food, on the ground that genetic modification
creates risks to human health and to the environment. The problem is that genetic
modification of food also promises benefits to human health and the environment—and
by eliminating those benefits, regulation itself threatens to run afoul of the Precautionary
Principle. When the principle seems to give guidance, it is often because those who use it
are focusing on one aspect of risk-related situations and neglecting others.
It is possible to go much further. A great deal of evidence suggests the possibility
that an expensive regulation can have adverse effects on life and health.32 It has been
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urged that a statistical life can be lost for every expenditure of $7 million33; one study
suggests that an expenditure of $15 million produces a loss of life.34 Another suggests
that poor people are especially vulnerable to this effect—that a regulation that reduces
wealth for the poorest 20% of the population will have twice as large a mortality effect as
a regulation that reduces wealth for the wealthiest 20%.35 If poor people are paying a
significant amount for modest environmental benefits, their health might be made worse
rather than better. To be sure, both the phenomenon and the underlying mechanisms are
reasonably disputed (and Ackerman and Heinzerling reasonably dispute it).36 For
purposes of applying the Precautionary Principle, the only point is that sensible people
believe in that association. It follows that a multimillion dollar expenditure for
“precaution” has -- as a worst case scenario -- significant adverse health effects, with an
expenditure of $200 million possibly leading to perhaps as many as twenty or more lives
lost.
This point makes the Precautionary Principle hard to implement not merely where
regulation introduces or increases substitute risks, but in any case in which the regulation
costs a significant amount. If this is so, the Precautionary Principle, for that very reason,
raises doubts about many regulations. If the principle argues against any action that
carries a small risk of imposing significant harm, then we should be reluctant to spend a
great deal of money to reduce risks, simply because those expenditures themselves carry
risks. Here is the sense in which, the Precautionary Principle, taken for all that it is worth,
is paralyzing: It stands as an obstacle to regulation and nonregulation, and to everything
in between.37
Ackerman and Heinzerling do not sufficiently appreciate this point. They neglect
the possibility that expensive regulation will actually hurt real people. Consider their
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seemingly offhand remark about protection against workplace hazards: The “costs of the
regulation would probably be borne by the employers who would be required to maintain
safer workplaces” (p. 193). But the costs of regulation are often borne not only by
“employers,” but also by consumers, whose prices increase, and by workers, who might
find fewer and less remunerative jobs. When government imposes large costs on
“polluters,” consumers and workers are likely to pay part of the bill. And if prices
increase, some risks will increase as well. To be sure, some environmental regulations do
increase employment and decrease prices. But as a general rule, there is no reason to
believe that regulatory imposition of high costs will benefit workers and consumers; the
opposite is more likely to be true.
In the context of cell phones, this point helps illuminates a quite remarkable fact,
one to which Burgess gives too little attention: Notwithstanding the popularity of
precautionary thinking, and the apparent intensity of public fears, those fears did not, in
fact, produce large-scale controls on either phones or towers. Burgess offers no
explanation of why such controls did not materialize, but his brief discussion of Finland
provides a useful clue. Is it really a paradox, or an irony, that fears of cell phones were
especially weak in a nation that has the largest percentage of cell phone users in the
world? I do not believe so. The Finnish economy is heavily dependent on Nokia and thus
the cell phone industry; people in Finland do not want the Finnish economy to collapse.
And if most citizens depend on cell phones, they are far less likely to accept
sensationalistic claims of risk, simply because they have so much to lose from regulation.
(Imagine, for example, the likely public reaction to a current suggestion by an American
politician that cell phones should be banned because they pose a cancer risk.) If the
benefits of cell phone use are evident to all or most, then people will demand a great deal
of evidence that the harm is real. In short, the very idea of precaution loses some of its
appeal when people are aware that precaution imposes costs and even risks of its own.38
When people are aware of that fact, some kind of balancing, involving both costs and
benefits, is likely to emerge.

38

See the treatment of fungibility in Howard Margolis, Dealing with Risk (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1999).

20

In a brief but illuminating discussion of another environmental issue, Burgess
strongly supports the general point. He refers to a mining town in Colorado whose
citizens were deemed, by the Environmental Protection Agency, to be at risk from toxic
contamination. The town’s citizens, already suffering from serious economic decline,
responded not with fear, and much less with enthusiasm for a precautionary approach, but
by demonizing the EPA, which it regarded as “the devil incarnate. Grimly they recounted
how government bureaucrats had invaded their town uninvited, threatening residents with
the prospect of condemned property, involuntary relocation, and unwelcome new legal
requirements. . . . And all, they claimed, over a hazard ‘that doesn’t exist.’” (p. 272). Far
from succumbing to panic, citizens of the mining town were well aware of how much
they had to lose from aggressive regulation; hence they sought to dismiss real evidence of
harm. Precautions and precautionary thinking seem far less attractive when people
believe that precautions would produce significant costs and risks.
Burgess does not draw attention to one of the remarkable lessons of his story,
which is that the cell phone scare did not produce aggressive regulation not only because
the evidence of harm was weak, but also and still more fundamentally because a growing
number of people use cell phones and would be inconvenienced, or far worse, by such
measures. (Consider the fact that cell phones are often used to obtain help in emergency
situations.) In the context of genetically modified food, by contrast, the costs of
regulation are not highly visible, at least not to Europeans. Precautionary thinking, in
short, is most appealing when the costs and burdens of precautions are not visible. When
both costs and benefits are on the public viewscreen, people become intuitive cost-benefit
analysts, and they tend to be cautious about precautions—unless the evidence in their
favor is strong. This point brings us directly to the questions raised by CBA.
V. Costs and Benefits
As Ackerman and Heinzerling stress, some of the most difficult questions for
CBA involve the translation of risks into monetary equivalents. Recall that under current
practice, the monetary values come mostly from involves real-world markets, producing
evidence of compensation levels for actual risks. It is important to see that in basing costbenefit analysis on calculations of this kind, regulators are not, in fact, producing a “value
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of a statistical life.” In fact they are not “valuing life” at all. They are not saying that the
average American would pay $6 million to avoid death, or that a human life is, in some
metaphysical sense, worth that amount. Instead they are generating numbers that reflect
the market value of statistical risks. Typically agencies are dealing with low-level risks,
on the order of 1/100,000, and when they “value a life” at $6 million, they are really
saying that the evidence suggests that people must be paid $60 to be subject to a risk of
that magnitude—and that government will build on that evidence in making regulatory
decisions.
A. The Argument for WTP
Ackerman and Heinzerling think that this practice is a form of madness, and
hence they do not pause to ask why regulators in a democratic society might care about
market valuations of statistical risks. But there are two possible answers, both connected
with individual choice, and both growing directly out of prominent strands in liberal
theory. The first involves welfare; the second involves autonomy.
To clarify the point, assume a society in which people face multiple risks of
1/100,000, and in which every person is both adequately informed and willing to pay no
more and no less than $60 to eliminate each of those risks. Assume too that the cost of
eliminating these 1/100,000 risks is widely variable, ranging from close to zero to
hundreds of millions of dollars. Assume finally that the cost of eliminating any risk is
borne entirely by those who benefit from risk elimination. Under that assumption,
regulation imposes the equivalent of user’s fee; for example, people’s water bills will
entirely reflect the costs of a policy that eliminates a 1/100,000 of getting cancer from
arsenic in drinking water. If the per-person cost is $100, each water bill will be increased
by exactly that amount.
At first glance, use of WTP, under the stated assumptions, is easy to defend. Why
should people be forced to pay an amount for regulation that exceeds their WTP? Of
course we might believe that a measure of redistribution is appropriate—that private
sources, or government, should provide people with regulatory protection for free. But
regulation need not, and often does not, amount to a subsidy to those who benefit from it.
After the enactment of workers’ compensation regulation, nonunionized workers faced a
dollar-for-dollar wage reduction, corresponding almost perfectly to the expected value of
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the benefits they received.39 For drinking water regulation, something similar is involved.
The cost of regulations is passed onto consumers in the form of higher water bills.40
More particularly, those who are interested in welfare will insist on the relevance
of WTP under the stated assumptions.41 If people are willing to pay $60, but no more, to
eliminate a risk of 1/100,000, then we have good reason to think that their welfare is
increased by asking them to pay that amount—and that their welfare is decreased by
asking them to pay more. There are many demands on people’s budgets, and if they
refuse to spend more than $60 on a 1/100,000 risk, it may because they would like to use
their money for food, shelter, recreation, education, or any number of other goods.
Regulation can operate as a forced exchange , and by hypothesis, a forced exchange on
terms that people dislike will make them worse off.42
For purposes of evaluating regulation, it does not matter if the existing
distribution of income is unjust or if poor people are, in an intelligible sense, coerced to
run certain risks. The remedy for unjust distributions, and for that form of coercion, is not
to require people to buy regulatory benefits on terms that they find unacceptable. Suppose
that people are willing to pay only $60 to eliminate a 1/100,000 risk because they are not
rich, and that if they had double their current wealth, they would be willing to pay $120.
Even if this is so, government does people no favors by forcing them to pay the amount
that they would pay if they had more money. In ridiculing WTP, Ackerman and
Heinzerling devote too little attention to this point.
If we reject the argument from welfare, we might nonetheless rely on willingness
to pay on grounds of personal autonomy.43 On this view, people should be sovereign over
their own lives, and this principle means that government should respect personal choices
about how to use limited resources (again so long as those choices are adequately
informed). When people decline to devote more than $60 to eliminate a 1/100,000 risk, it
39
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is because they would prefer to spend the money in a way that seems to them more
desirable. If regulators reject people’s actual judgments, then they are insulting their
dignity. The use of willingness to pay therefore can claim a simultaneous defense from
both utilitarian and deontological accounts.
When the assumptions just outlined are met, we have what might be described as
easy cases for the use of the WTP criterion. Some people contend that money and health
are incommensurable—that our reflective judgments do not permit us to line up dollars
and risks along a single metric.44 Suppose that this is so. To see the easy cases as such, it
is not necessary to make controversial arguments about commensurability or to venture
into controversial philosophical territory. The underlying claim is a simple pragmatic
one, to the effect that people are willing to trade money against decreases in statistical
risks. If people actually make those trades, then government might well build on their
practices in designing policies.
B. Objections
There are several possible objections. Perhaps the most obvious would point to
people’s rights. On one view, people have a right not to be subjected to risks of a certain
magnitude, and the use of WTP will violate that right. In fact it is fully reasonable to say
that whatever their WTP, human beings have a right not to be subject to risks above a
particular level. Imagine, for example, that poor people live in a place where they face a
1/20 annual risk of dying from water pollution; it makes sense to say that the government
is required to reduce that risk even if people are willing to pay only $1 to eliminate it and
the per-person cost is $5. The only qualification is that in practice, rights are resourcedependent. What rights people are able to claim, against their government, is a product of
the amount of available money, and hence people’s legitimate arguments for protection
are inevitably affected by the level of resources in the society. But let us simply assume
here that risks above a certain level should count as violative of rights.
It might be added that people have a right not to be subjected to the intentional or
reckless imposition of harm, whatever their WTP. If a company subjects the citizens of a
town to a high danger, and it does so maliciously or without the slightest concern for their
44
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welfare, the rights of those citizens have been violated, even if their WTP is low. Indeed,
some such systems impose strict liability for harms. Well-functioning legal systems make
wrongdoers pay for the injuries they inflict.
As abstract claims about people’s rights, these objections are entirely plausible.
Something has gone badly wrong if people are exposed to serious risks and if their low
WTP prevents them from doing anything in response. Things are even worse if
government uses their low WTP to justify inaction in the face of those risks. It would be
ludicrous to suggest that WTP is determinative of the appropriate use of government
subsidies; a redistributive policy hardly tracks people’s WTP. (Would it make sense to
say that government will give poor people a check for $100 only if they are willing to pay
$100 for that check?)
In many cases of environmental regulation, however, rights violations are not
involved; we are speaking here of statistically small risks. Even if rights are involved
when people are subject to small risks, people should be permitted to waive those rights
at an agreeable price (at least on the assumptions that I am making). The proper response
to an apparent rights violation is not to force people to buy protection that they do not
want, but to provide a subsidy that will give them the benefit for free or enable them to
receive the benefit at what is, for them, an acceptable price. But regulation—and this is
the key point—often does not such thing; and for the easy cases, the question is one of
regulation under the stated assumptions. So long as that is the question, use of WTP does
not violate anyone’s rights.
What about environmental wrongdoers? If a company has intentionally,
recklessly, or even negligently exposed people to harm, it should be held accountable
through the payment of damages, even if the WTP of the affected population is low. It is
possible for the tort system to go much further. A sensible legal system might well
choose to force companies to internalize the costs of their activities by requiring them to
pay for the harms they have caused, even if there has been neither intentional nor reckless
wrongdoing. Within tort theory, there is an active debate on this question, and it is
possible to support strict liability by reference to a range of theoretical positions.45 But
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the subject here is regulation, not compensation via the tort system. It would be odd to
say that people have a right to be required to pay more for risk reduction than they are
willing to pay, at least if they are adequately informed. If people are willing to pay only
$25 to eliminate a risk of 1/100,000, a reference to their “rights” cannot plausibly justify
the conclusion that government should impose a regulation that costs them $75.
An independent objection would stress, as Ackerman and Heinzerling do, that
people are citizens, not merely consumers. On this view, regulatory choices should be
made not after aggregating WTP, but after citizens have deliberated with one another
about their preferences and values. The argument against forced exchanges treats people
as consumers; it sees their decisions about safety as the same as their decisions about all
other commodities. For some decisions, this approach is badly misconceived. The
American constitutional system is a deliberative democracy,46 not a maximization
machine, and many social judgments should be made by citizens engaged in deliberative
discussion with one another rather than by aggregating the individual choices of
consumers.
In the context of racial and sex discrimination, for example, sensible societies do
not aggregate people’s WTP. The level of permissible discrimination is not set by using
market evidence to see how much people would be willing to pay to discriminate (or to
be free from discrimination). Even if discriminators would be willing to pay a great deal
to avoid associating with members of unpopular groups, such discrimination is banned.
Nor is the protection of endangered species chosen on the basis of aggregated WTP.
Whether and when to protect members of endangered species is a moral question to be
resolved through democratic discussion, not through exercises in consumer sovereignty.
In many environmental contexts, use of WTP would wrongly see people as consumers,
purchasing products, rather than as citizens, deliberating about values. Speaking in this
vein, Amartya Sen emphasizes that “discussions and exchange, and even political
arguments, contribute to the formation and revision of values.”47 He urges that in the
particular context of environmental protection, solutions require us “to go beyond looking
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only for the best reflection of existing individual preferences, or the most acceptable
procedures for choices based on those preferences.”48
Sen’s claims identify some serious limitations on the use of WTP. But such
objections should not be read for more than they are worth. In trading off safety and
health in our own private lives, we do not have static values and preferences. Much of the
time, our choices are a product of reflection, even if we are simply acting as consumers.
To be sure, moral questions are not to be resolved by aggregating private willingness to
pay. Some preferences, even though backed by WTP, are morally off-limits, and policy
should not take account of them. In addition, many people are unwilling to pay a great
deal for goods that have strong moral justifications; animal welfare is an example. In
these circumstances, the market model is inapplicable and WTP tells us very little.
But what about the easy cases? Do these arguments suggest that government
should override individual choices about how much to spend to eliminate low-level risks,
even when those choices are adequately informed? For environmental protection
generally, it is indeed important to go beyond “the best reflection of existing individual
preferences.” But this point does not establish that people should be required to pay (for
example) $100 to eliminate mortality risks of 1/100,000 when they are willing to pay
only $75. If people’s WTP reflects impulsiveness, recklessness, an absence of
information, or insufficient deliberation, then it is important for other people, in
government as elsewhere, to draw their attention to that fact. And in some cases, a low
WTP might be overridden on the ground that it is rooted in errors, factual or otherwise.
But these points should not be taken as a general objection to my conclusion about the
easy cases, and to suggest that government should force people to reduce statistical risks
at an expense that they deem excessive.
A final objection would emphasize the possibility that people’s preferences have
adapted to limitations in existing opportunities, including deprivation.49 Perhaps people
show a low WTP for environmental goods, including health improvements, simply
because they have adjusted to environmental bads, including health risks. Perhaps
people’s WTP reflects an effort to reduce cognitive dissonance through the conclusion
48
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that risks are lower than they actually are.50 To generalize the objection, perhaps people
suffer from a problem of “miswanting”51; they want things that do not promote their
welfare, and they do not want things that would promote their welfare. If this is so, then
WTP loses much of its underlying justification; people’s decisions do not actually
promote their welfare,52 and their autonomy, properly understood, may not require
respect for their decisions, which may be nonautonomous. In other words, the idea of
autonomy requires not merely respect for whatever preferences people happen to have,
but also social conditions that allow preferences to be developed in a way that does not
reflect coercion or injustice. With respect to some risks, the relevant preferences are
nonautonomous; consider the fact that many women face a risk of male violence under
circumstances in which they believe that little can be done and hence adapt. If
government can be confident that people are not willing to pay for goods from which
they would greatly benefit, government should probably abandon WTP.
In the context of ordinary regulatory policy, however, this objection has more
theoretical than practical interest. Typically we are speaking of steps that would reduce
low-level mortality risks (say, 1/50,000). Much of the time, there is no reason to believe
that the use of informed WTP (say, $100) is a product of adaptive preferences. When
there is such a reason, the judgment about the easy cases must be revised.
C. Harder Cases
There is an obvious artificiality in the assumptions behind the easy cases. Most
important, people do not always bear the full social costs of the regulatory benefits they
receive. Sometimes they pay only a fraction of those costs—or possibly even nothing at
all. When this is so, the analysis is much more complicated. In the context of air pollution
regulation, for example, there is a complex set of distributional effects, and on balance,
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poor people, and members of minority communities, appear to be net gainers.53 A CBA,
based on WTP, might not produce an adequate account of the welfare effects of air
pollution regulation.54 And even if it does, an account of welfare effects would not end
the normative question, because the distributional gains are important to consider.
Suppose, for example, that beneficiaries of a proposed drinking water regulation
are willing to pay only $80 to eliminate a risk of 1/50,000 in drinking water; that the perperson cost of eliminating a 1/50,000 risk is $100; but that for every dollar of that cost,
the beneficiaries pay only 70 cents. The remaining 30 cents might be paid by water
companies themselves, in the form of reduced profits, or by employees of the water
companies, in the form of reduced wages and fewer jobs. In this example, the costs of the
regulation exceed the benefits; it is inefficient. But by hypothesis, the regulation makes
its beneficiaries of the regulation better off. If CBA provides the rule of decision, and if
the WTP criterion is used, the fact that the monetized costs exceed the monetized benefits
is decisive. But as a normative matter, the analysis here is far harder than in the easy
cases. On what assumption should the WTP numbers be decisive?
The assumption must be that economic efficiency is the goal of government, at
least in the context of environmental regulation—that in order to know what to do, we
should aggregate the benefits and costs of regulation, and act if and only if the benefits
exceed the costs. When using the WTP numbers, government is acting as a maximization
machine, aggregating all benefits and costs as measured by the WTP criterion. But this is
an implausible understanding of what government should be doing. In fact it represents a
shift from the relatively uncontroversial Pareto criterion, exemplified in the easy cases, to
a version of the far more controversial Kaldor-Hicks criterion,55 which assesses policy by
asking this question: Are the gainers winning more than the losers are losing? The
Kaldor-Hicks criterion is sometimes described as potential Pareto superiority, because it
asks whether in principle, the winners could compensate the losers, and a surplus could
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be left over. The difficulty of course is that Pareto superiority is merely potential. Some
people really are losing and others are gaining.
In the harder cases, the gainers are gaining less (in monetary terms) than the
losers are losing -- and hence CBA suggests that regulation is unjustified. Under the
assumptions I have given, the regulation is indeed inefficient: Its social cost is higher
than its social benefit. But is the regulation undesirable? This is not at all clear. The first
problem is that WTP is measuring gains and loses in monetary terms, rather than in
welfare terms. It is possible that those who gain, in the harder cases, are gaining more
welfare than the losers lose; WTP is not dispositive on that question.56 The second
problem is distributional. Suppose that in terms of overall welfare, the regulation is not
desirable; it makes aggregate welfare lower rather than higher. But suppose too that those
who benefit are poorer and more disadvantaged than those who lose. If, for example,
those who are willing to pay $80 are disproportionately poor, and those who pay the
remainder are disproportionately wealthy, the regulation might be plausibly justified
despite the welfare loss.
It is natural to respond here that if redistribution is what is sought, then it should
be produced not through regulation but through the tax system, which is a more efficient
way of transferring resources to those who need help.57 But suppose that redistribution is
not going to happen through the tax system. If so, then the regulation in the harder cases
cannot be ruled off-limits despite its inefficiency. The fact that a regulation is helpful to
the most disadvantaged is not decisive in its favor. If it is trivially helpful, and if it inflicts
huge costs on everyone else, little can be said for it. But everything depends on the
magnitude of the relevant effects. A program that produces large gains for the least welloff would seem to be justified even if it imposes, in terms of WTP, slightly higher costs
than benefits on balance.
The simple conclusion is that the argument for using WTP is most plausible in
cases in which the beneficiaries of regulation pay all or most of its cost. In such cases,
WTP is reasonably used so long as people are adequately informed and so long as the
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question is how much they should be forced to spend to avoid existing risks. The analysis
must be different when the beneficiaries of regulation are paying only a small fraction of
its costs. In such cases, it is possible that the regulation can be justified as a redistributive
measure or on welfare grounds. To know whether it can be so justified, it is necessary to
go beyond CBA and to identify the winners and losers.58 Ackerman and Heinzerling
neglect to distinguish between the easy cases and the harder ones, and thus fail to
appreciate the arguments that lie behind use of WTP.
D. On Individuation and Discount Rates
Many of the most interesting arguments offered by Ackerman and Heinzerling are
best seen as attacks on CBA as currently practiced, not on CBA as such. Consider, for
example, their suggestion that it is foolish to extrapolate, from workplace studies, a single
figure for the value of statistical risks. Ackerman and Heinzerling note that people care
not only about the magnitude of the risk (is it 1/10,000 or 1/100,000?) but also about its
nature and context. A risk of death from cancer might well be worse than a statistically
equivalent risk of a sudden, unanticipated death. A risk of death from air pollution, or
drinking water, might well produce a higher WTP than a statistically equivalent risk of
death from a workplace accident.
This claim is plausible, but it is most sensibly taken as an argument for a more
refined version of CBA, one that insists on variations among statistically equivalent
risks.59 A single number is genuinely obtuse; in fact it is inconsistent with the very theory
that gives rise to the use of WTP in the first place. Recall that if WTP is relevant, it is
because its use promotes welfare, autonomy, or both. If this is so, regulators should
consult actual WTP, which varies across risks, rather than a single or unitary WTP, which
grows only out of one set of risks, and which (as Ackerman and Heinzerling say) cannot
plausibly be applied to every risk of a given statistical magnitude. The real question is not
whether to have more differentiated monetary values for qualitatively identical risks, but
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where to find reliable evidence on which to base those values. Economists are starting to
fill the relevant gaps, in a way that supports the suggestion that a single WTP is far too
crude.60 It would not be difficult to continue to use WTP, but to take account of the fact
that it varies across risks, even if they are statistically identical.
Ackerman and Heinzerling also object, plausibly, to the application of the
standard discount rate for money to the valuation of future gains in terms of both
mortality and morbidity.61 But suppose that no discount rate is appropriate -- that deaths
in 2050 should be valued the same way as deaths in 2010. If so, the analysis of costs and
benefits would not be the same; but it would remain possible to calculate both costs and
benefits. In any case the analysis of discounting must make a distinction to which
Ackerman and Heinzerling devote insufficient attention.62 Sometimes environmental
regulation protects living people from latent harms -- risks that will come to fruition not
now, but ten, twenty, or thirty years from now. It seems clear that some discount rate
should be applied to latent harms. Most people, intuitively and on reflection, would much
prefer to face a harm in the future rather than immediately.63 Hence some kind of
discount rate makes a great deal of sense for harms that will not come to fruition for a
long time (even if the discount rate for such harms does not turn out to be the same as the
discount rate for money). But sometimes environmental regulation protects members of
future generations; and this is a quite different problem. If a program would save one
hundred people born in 2020, it is not clear that it deserves less enthusiasm than a
program that would save one hundred people born in 2002.
On the other hand, a refusal to use a discount rate creates a number of logical and
practical conundrums, especially if it would impose high costs on current generations—a
particular problem in light of the fact that if current generations face high costs, posterity
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is likely to be hurt too. Hence aggressive regulation, at least if it is extremely costly, may
not help future generations at all. It has also been argued that if regulators are indifferent
as between lives saved now and lives saved in the future, but discount costs at some
positive rate, then it makes sense for them to delay life-saving expenditures indefinitely.64
In any case it has been suggested that instead of discounting lives, regulators might
simply use the future discounted (monetary) cost of saving lives at the time when lives
are saved—an approach that is mathematically identical and hence produces the same
analysis.65
I cannot resolve here the complex questions raised by individuation of WTP and
by discount rates.66 Ackerman and Heinzerling are right to raise questions about existing
practice.67 It seems clear that greater individuation is justified for statistically equivalent
risks that people consider different to be qualitatively different; it also seems clear that a
discount rate should be used for latent harms. The appropriate approach to risks faced by
future generations remains unsettled. The simplest point is that if these questions are
properly answered, CBA will be mended, not ended.
VI. Uncertainty, Catastrophe, and Maximin
Thus far I have emphasized issues of monetization, as highlighted by Ackerman
and Heinzerling. But as Posner’s discussion demonstrates, some of the most interesting
problems raised by CBA have nothing to do with the translation of risks into monetary
equivalents. Recall that Posner’s assessment of the risks of particle accelerators contains
what he himself describes as arbitrariness. Nor is the problem limited to unconventional
problems of this kind. Consider a fairly mundane issue under the Safe Drinking Water
Act: If government reduces permissible levels of arsenic in drinking water from 50 parts
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per billion (ppb) to 10 ppb, what, exactly, are the expected benefits? On the basis of
existing evidence, many answers are scientifically respectable.68 For a regulation
mandating that reduction, the EPA estimated that it would prevent about twenty-five
premature deaths and roughly an equivalent number of nonfatal cancer cases. But on the
basis of the same inconclusive evidence that was before the EPA, it would have been
reasonable to project that the regulation would prevent as few as six deaths or as many as
110. The evidence suggested a range, not a specific estimate.
As a result, critics of CBA might contend the method gives only the illusion of
precision. Even before deaths are translated into monetary equivalents, regulators might
well be required to make judgments of value, not merely fact, in projecting the likely
effects of regulatory protection. But this point should not be read for more than it is
worth. When specific estimates are not feasible, the evidence often permits agencies to
specify a range. For the arsenic rule, they could say, for example, that a 10 ppb standard
is likely to prevent a minimum of six and a maximum of 110 deaths, and they might
undertake cost-benefit analysis with reference to the range. Such an analysis would not
resolve the question of what to do, but it would greatly discipline the inquiry.
In some circumstances, however, existing information puts regulators in a far
more difficult situation. These are cases of genuine uncertainty, in which probabilities
cannot be assigned to the expected outcomes. Posner is much concerned with these
situations. While he does not spell out the argument, his treatment of catastrophic risks
points to a promising possibility for a narrower, and more appealing, version of the
Precautionary Principle, a kind of Anti-Catastrophe Principle. Suppose that citizens face
catastrophic risks to which probabilities cannot be assigned; suppose, that is, that they are
operating under conditions of uncertainty rather than risk. If regulators are operating
under such conditions, they might well do best to follow maximin, identifying the worstcase scenarios and choosing the approach that eliminates the worst of these. It follows
that if aggressive measures are justified to reduce the risks associated with global
warming, one reason is that those risks are potentially catastrophic and existing science
does not enable us to assign probabilities to the worst-case scenarios. Maximin is an
appealing decision rule whenever uncertainty is present, but in the regulatory context, it
68
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is particularly important for extremely bad outcomes. When Ackerman and Heinzerling
suggest the value of focusing on the worst case, they are offering bad advice under
circumstances of risk; but if they are understood to be speaking of uncertainty, they are
on much firmer ground (see pp. 225–26).
In an illuminating effort to recast the Precautionary Principle,69 Stephen Gardiner
adapts John Rawls’s argument that when “grave risks” are involved, and when
probabilities cannot be assigned to the occurrence of those risks, maximin is the
appropriate decision rule, at least if the chooser “cares very little, if anything, for what he
might gain among the minimum stipend that he can, in fact, be sure of by following the
maximin rule.”70 Applying Rawls’ claims about the original position and distributive
justice to the environmental setting, Gardiner urges that maximin, and hence a “core”
Precautionary Principle, is justified (1) in the face of potentially catastrophic outcomes
(2) where probabilities cannot be assigned and (3) when the loss, from following
maximin, is a matter of relative indifference. Gardiner adds, sensibly, that to justify
maximin, the threats that are potentially catastrophic must satisfy some minimal threshold
of plausibility. If they can be dismissed as unrealistic, then maximin should not be
followed. Gardiner believes that the problem of global warming can be usefully analyzed
in these terms and that it presents a good case for the application of maximin.
This argument seems to me on the right track, but its conclusion, as stated, risks
triviality, above all because of condition (3). If individuals and societies can eliminate an
uncertain danger of catastrophe for essentially no cost, then of course they should
eliminate that risk. But the real world rarely presents problems of this form. In real
disputes, the elimination of uncertain dangers of catastrophe imposes both costs and risks.
In the context of global warming, for example, it is implausible to say that regulatory
choosers can or should care “very little, if anything,” for what might be lost by following
maximin. If we followed maximin for global warming, we would spend a great deal to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and the result would almost certainly be higher prices
for gasoline and energy, probably producing increases in unemployment and poverty.
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For environmental problems, does the argument for maximin provide help beyond
the trivial cases? I believe that if properly reformulated, it does, for one simple reason:
Condition (3) is too stringent and should be abandoned. Even if the costs of following
maximin are significant, and even if choosers care a great deal about incurring those
costs, it makes sense to follow maximin when they face uncertain dangers of catastrophe.
The hardest question here is: Under circumstances of uncertainty, how much cost does it
make sense to incur in the service of maximin? Consider a straightforward case: The
catastrophic dangers associated with global warming could be eliminated if every nation
contributed $2 million to a fund to combat that risk. Surely that cost would be acceptable.
Consider a very different case: The catastrophic dangers associated with global warming
could be eliminated only if every nation contributed enough resources to reduce standards
of living by 50% world-wide, with a corresponding increase in global poverty. If global
warming really does pose an uncertain danger of total catastrophe, the logic of maximin
argues in favor of this extraordinary reduction in world-wide standards of living; but it is
not clear that following that logic would be reasonable. To incur costs of this magnitude,
we might want to insist that the danger of catastrophe rises above a minimal threshold—
that there be demonstrable probability, and a not-so-low one, that the catastrophic risk
will occur. It would seem far more sensible to take less costly steps now and to engage in
further research, attempting to learn enough to know more about the probability that the
catastrophic outcomes will occur.71
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For global warming, Posner’s interesting recommendations seem vulnerable for
this reason. Though a firm defender of quantification, he offers too little in the way of
numbers here. To evaluate his proposal for new taxes on greenhouse gas emissions,
designed to produce technological innovation, it would be valuable to know both the
costs of that initiative and the likely benefits. Assessment of costs would not be easy,
because we cannot project the rate of technological innovation; but if the taxes are
significant, large increases should be expected in the price of energy, including gasoline,
with particularly serious effects on poor people. Because of the range of uncertainties in
the science of global warming, assessment of benefits is even harder. But at the very
least, it should be possible to measure the likely effects of such taxes on greenhouse gas
emissions. If the relevant taxes can be projected to spur significant reductions, then the
argument for them is certainly strengthened.
Unlike Posner, I suspect that the likelihood of real catastrophe from global
warming is low, and hence that he is wrong to say that no probability can be assigned to
it. But I am far from an expert on the underlying science, and in any case Posner
convincingly argues that some kind of positive tax on carbon emissions would be costjustified. The larger point is that an Anti-Catastrophe Principle has a legitimate place in
environmental regulation, applying to uncertain dangers of catastrophe, at least when the
costs of reducing those dangers are not huge and when incurring those costs does not
divert resources from more pressing problems. The Anti-Catastrophe Principle is not the
Precautionary Principle; it is far narrower than that, and it covers only a small set of
environmental problems. But it nonetheless deserves to play a role in environmental
protection, plausibly including global warming—calling for significant (but not hugely
costly) steps now, accompanied by further research to obtain a better understanding of the
likelihood of real disaster.
Four qualifications are important. First, the Anti-Catastrophe Principle must be
attentive to the full range of social risks; it makes no sense to take steps to avert
catastrophe if those very steps would create catastrophic risks of their own. Second, use
of the principle should be closely attentive to the idea of cost-effectiveness, which
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requires regulators to choose the least costly means of achieving their ends. In the context
of global warming, there are many methods by which to reduce the relevant risks. Both
nations and international institutions should choose those methods that minimize costs.
Third, distributional considerations matter. The principle should be applied in a way that
reduces extreme burdens on those least able to bear them. For global warming, there is a
particular need to ensure that citizens of poor nations are not required to pay a great deal
to contribute to the solution of a problem for which wealthy nations are most
responsible—partly because the latter caused the problem in the first place, but also
because poor people, faced with a global risk, need and deserve help from those who can
provide it. Fourth, costs matter. The extent of precautions cannot reasonably be divorced
from their expense. Where the worst-case scenario is truly catastrophic and when
probabilities cannot be assigned, a large margin of safety makes a great deal of sense.
Conclusion
Because regulation itself often introduces new hazards, the Precautionary
Principle risks incoherence; it forbids the very steps that it requires. For its part, CBA
runs into two serious difficulties. The first involves the specification of both probabilities
and outcomes. The second involves the translation of environmental risks into monetary
equivalents.
For many of the problems involved in environmental regulation, it is possible to
identify a range of outcomes, in a way that allows CBA to get off the ground. But where
catastrophic outcomes are possible and where regulators are operating under
circumstances of uncertainty, it may well make sense to follow maximin. Even in such
circumstances, however, an inquiry into costs cannot sensibly be avoided, not least
because nations that impose high costs might increase mortality and morbidity risks as a
result.
With respect to monetization, I have suggested that it is important to distinguish
between the easy cases for using WTP and the harder ones. Where the beneficiaries of
environmental regulation pay all or most of its cost, the argument for using WTP is
especially strong. In such cases, beneficiaries are unlikely to be helped if they are
required to pay more than they are willing to pay; and requiring them to do so is an insult
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to their autonomy.72 But when the beneficiaries of environmental regulation pay little or
none of the costs, the regulation might be justified even if it fails CBA. To decide
whether it is, it is necessary to identify the likely winners and losers. The most general
conclusion is that CBA does not tell regulators all that they need to know; but without it,
they will know far too little.
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